

Macaroons and dCache

... or delegating in a cloudy world

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On behave of the project team



Federal Ministry of Education and Research





This talk is about the second 'A': Authorisation.

Quick recap: which is which?



Credential

Authentication

Authorization

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
Authorisation without authentication?





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That is this all about, Starting with a use-case








What are bearer tokens?

Bearer token is something the user presents with a request so the server will authorise it. There's no interaction between client and server.

- Examples of bearer tokens:
- HTTP BASIC authn, anything stored as a cookies.

Counter-examples:

- X.509 credential,
- SAML,
- Kerberos.



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Bearer tokens for download authz

• Redirection should work without JavaScript,

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• Simple: **embed token** in redirection URL.

http://webdav.example.org/path/to/file?authz=<TOKEN>

(There are nicer ways of embedding the token, but the URL is the only thing we can control)

- Complete token always sent with the request.
- What can we do to stop someone **stealing** this token?
- ... or make the token useless if they steal it.

Introducing Macaroons







Macaroons 101




- Macaroon is a **bearer token**.
- Macaroon contains zero or more caveats.
- Each caveat **limits** something:
 - who can use it, or
 - what they do with it.
- Anyone can **add** a caveat to a macaroon:
 - Create a new macaroon that is more limited.
- Nobody can **remove** a caveat from a macaroon.






3rd party caveats – extra cool! dCache.org

- 1st party caveat can be satisfied by the client.
- 3rd party caveat requires proof from some other service; e.g.
 - only fred@facebook,
 - only members of VO ATLAS,
 - only if not part of a **denial-of-service attack**.
- The proof is another macaroon: a discharge macaroon.





- The client proves it satisfies a 3rd party caveat by having a **discharge macaroon**.
- The original macaroon is only useful with a valid discharge macaroon.
- The discharge-macaroon can have **caveats**:
 - Short-lived discharge macaroon can be used to simulate X.509's certificate revocation list.
 - The discharge macaroon can have 3rd-party caveats.





For what else are macaroons good?

Private Sharing!

Enabling sharing: a new interface

- Create a macaroon:
 - Need to know the macaroon to access the file.

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- List macaroons:
 - Facilitate sharing files.
- Facilitate adding caveats:
 - Purely in-browser or server-side?
 - Third-party caveats? (e.g., member-of-ATLAS caveat)
- **Destroy** macaroons:
 - Unclear if this really makes sense.

The END

Further reading :

On dCache

On macaroons by Google:

Presentation





www.dCache.org

Macaroons: Cookies with Contextual Caveats for Decentralized Authorization in the Cloud.

Paper



http://research.google.com/pubs/pub41892.html